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Real Employees: Cognitive Psychology and the 
Adjudication of Non-Competition Agreements 
Rena Mara Samole* 
Today many companies ask employees to sign non-competition 
agreements.1 The reasons for this trend include increases in 
workplace mobility, escalating competition, advancing technology, 
and thriving service-oriented industries.2 To protect themselves from 
unfair competition, employers increasingly ask lower-level 
employees to sign non-competition agreements—often before 
employees even start to work for the employer.3 In the past, such 
practices occurred much later in an employee’s career.4 Still, non-
competition agreements fail to deter most job applicants, who care 
mostly about their salary and the duration of their employment 
contract.5 In fact, employees usually fail to notice the terms of the 
 
 * J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2000. 
 1. For an explanation of this phenomenon, see William Corrigan, Non-Compete 
Agreements—An Overview, 54 J. MO. B. 140 (1998), explaining that, for many companies,  
profit margings are shrinkng and competition is fierce . . . [M]anagement wants to 
protect the business from key employees who leave to compete against them . . . . 
[S]uccessful employees are often in high demand and want the option to work for the 
highest bidder, or the employee wants to start his or her own business and compete 
directly against the former employer. 
Id. See Kendall B. Coffey & Thomas F. Nealor, III, Noncompete Agreements Under Florida 
Law: A Retrospective and a Requiem?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105, 1136-37 (1992) 
(“Covenants not to compete are already used in virtually every industry, through every 
employment level from managment to clerical, and even in hourly positions.”).  
 2. Ann Davis & Joann Lublin, More Managers Have Trouble Jumping Ship, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 3, 1997, at B1. In computer and other technology-based industries, employees at every 
level have access to an employer’s sensitive and confidential information. Id. In high-tech 
industries where technologies constantly transform, employees and development teams must be 
intimately familiar with the way the employer’s products work. Id. Consultants in a wide 
variety of fields must become experts in nearly every aspect of an employer’s operations by the 
very nature of their job description. Id. In addition, many companies understand that employees 
mold crucial relationships with customers and that, when employees leave, the customers 
usually go with them. Id. 
 3. See id.  
 4. See id.  
 5. See id. 
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non-competition agreement when they begin employment.6 
Accordingly, non-competition agreements are now ordinary additions 
to the terms of employment and subsequently become a recurring 
source of litigation.7 
Part I of this Note provides a summary of the current treatment of 
non-competition agreements. This section describes Missouri’s 
approach to non-competition agreements in detail. Missouri’s 
approach is then used as a point of reference to explain other states’ 
inconsistent treatment of these agreements.8 Part II explicates recent 
advances in cognitive psychology relevant for contract law analysis. 
Part III applies cognitive psychologists’ discoveries about human 
cognitive limits to the employee faced with the decision of whether to 
sign a non-competition agreement. Finally, Part IV advocates the use 
of those discoveries in the future adjudication and regulation of non-
compete agreements. 
I. NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS IN MISSOURI AND OTHER 
STATES 
A. Missouri’s Rebuttable Presumption 
Like nearly every other jurisdiction, Missouri courts disfavor non-
competition agreements because such agreements interfere with an 
individual’s ability to earn a living and conflict with notions of a free 
economy and free marketability.9 When deciding to enforce a non-
competition agreement, the objective of Missouri courts is two-fold: 
 
 6. See id .  
 7. Tracey Staid, Enforceability of Noncompetition Agreements When Employment is At-
Will: Reformulating the Analysis, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPL. POL’Y J. 95 (1988).  
 8. Missouri law is described in detail to introduce some of the central issues involved in 
the adjudication of non-competition agreements. However, any state could be selected as a 
point of reference for the arguments set forth in this Note.  
 9. See, e.g., Sentilles Optical Serv. v. Phillips, 651 So. 2d 395, 398. (La. Ct. App. 1995) 
(noting that North Carolina courts disfavor non-competition agreements because they are 
contracts which restrain trade); Creative Entertainment, Inc. v. Lorenz & Proactive, Inc., 638 
N.E.2d 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Renal Treatment Ctrs. v. Braxton, 945 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1997) (citing CALAMARI & PERILLO, CONTRACTS §§ 16-19 (1977) and refusing to 
enforce a non-competition agreement signed by the former medical director of several kidney 
dialysis treatment centers because he had no contact with patients and therefore the center had 
no protectable interest).  
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to protect employers from unfair competition by former employees 
and to protect employees from unreasonable restraint by former 
employers.10 The Missouri Supreme Court requires 
“counterbalancing” which recognizes the public’s interest in 
protecting the freedom of persons to contract and to enforce 
contractual rights and obligations.11 In a more recent case, the 
Missouri Supreme Court stated that non-competition agreements 
restrain commerce and limit the employee’s freedom to pursue her 
own trade; therefore, courts carefully restrict the enforcement of such 
agreements.12 
Accordingly, non-competition agreements are presumed prima 
facie unenforceable in Missouri.13 That presumption is rebuttable, 
however, upon a showing of a legitimate protectable interest by the 
employer.14 Missouri courts generally recognize two categories of 
protectable interests: trade secrets15 and customer contacts.16 
1. “Trade Secrets” Defined by the Restatement of Torts 
Missouri courts adopted the concept of “trade secrets” as 
established by the Restatement of Torts.17 Employing the 
 
 10. See, e.g., Sturgis Equip. Co. v. Falcon Indus.  Sales Co., 930 S.W.2d 14, 17 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1996) (observing that courts must consider the threatened danger to the employer absent 
the non-competition agreement and noting that to be reasonable, the agreement must do no 
more than “protect employers from unfair competition by former employees without imposing 
unreasonable restraint on the employees.”).  
 11. See Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1973) (rejecting the notion that 
public policy should prevent the enforcement of all non-competition agreements).  
 12. Osage Glass, Inc. v. Donovan, 693 S.W.2d 71, 73-74 (Mo. 1985). 
 13. See Corrigan, supra note 1, at 141; Orchard Container Corp. v. Orchard, 601 S.W.2d 
299, 303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
 14. See, e.g., Easy Returns Midwest v. Schultz, 964 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) 
(noting that an employer may only seek to protect certain narrowly defined interests, namely 
trade secrets and stock in trade). 
 15. Id. at 454. See West Group Broad. v. Bell, 942 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) 
(citing Mo-Kan Cent. Recovery Co. v. Hedenkamp, 671 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1984)). See also Grebing v. First Nat’l Bank of Cape Girardeau, 613 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1981).  
 16. See supra notes 9 and 12.  
 17. According to the RESTATEMENT OF T ORTS § 757 (1977), a trade secret may: 
consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which is used in 
one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p289 Samole.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
292 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 4:289 
 
 
Restatement definition of a “trade secret,” a Missouri court observed 
that an enforceable non-competition agreement protects an employer 
from the “unauthorized dissemination and use of confidential 
information about an employer’s business.”18 Applying several of the 
factors suggested by the Restatement, the court noted that the 
employer made a significant effort to advise its employees of the 
confidential nature of the information and that competitors could, if 
unrestricted, use that information to determine the risk of success or 
 
a  process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine 
or other device, or a list of customers. . . It may, however, relate to the sale of goods or 
to other operations in the business, such as a code for determining discounts, rebates or 
other concessions in a price list or catalogue, or a list of specialized customers, or a 
method of bookkeeping other office management.  
Id. Recognizing that an exact definition of a “trade secret” is impossible, the drafters of the 
Restatement outlined several factors that courts should consider in order to determine whether 
information constitutes an employer’s trade secret:  
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent 
to which it its known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent 
of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the 
information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended 
by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the 
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.  
Id. In 1995, Missouri adopted the Uniform Trade Secret Act (MUTSA). MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 417.453 (1997). While no Missouri court has used the Act’s definition of a trade secret for the 
adjudication of a non-competition agreement, courts presumably will use the Act’s definition in 
the future. The MUTSA defines a trade secret as:  
[I]nformation, including but not limited to, technical or nontechnical data, a formula, 
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that: (a) Derives 
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, 
and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use; and (b) Is the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
§ 417.453(4) Other states that have adopted the Uniform Trade Secret Act include Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansa, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, 
Virginia, and Washington.  
 18. Cape Mobile Home Mart, Inc. v. Mobley, 780 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) 
(concluding that the employer demonstrated a legitimate protectable interest in confidential 
information provided to an employee sufficient to overcome the invalidity presumption of non-
competition agreements in Missouri). See also Nat’l Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 
18-19 (Mo. 1966) (finding that the employer failed to take any steps to keep secret and 
confidential the information asserted as a trade secret, and, therefore, such information was not 
within the Restatement’s definition of trade secret).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/10
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failure in competing with the employer.19 
2. The Employee Must Have Influence Over Customers or 
Substantial Dealings With Customers to Constitute Customer 
Contacts 
Missouri courts define a customer contact as “one who repeatedly 
has business dealings with a particular salesperson or business.”20 
The mere fact that an employee had some form of contact with 
customers is insufficient to establish an employer’s protectable 
interest in customer contacts.21 Rather, customer contacts derive from 
the influence an employee may acquire over her employer’s 
customers.22  
In Osage Glass, Inc. v. Donovan, rather than examining whether 
the employee had influence over the employer’s customers, the 
Missouri Supreme Court focused on whether the employee had 
substantial customer contacts.23 Using a broad notion of customer 
contacts, the court found that the employer had a legitimate 
protectable interest in its customer contacts, and thus enforced the 
non-competition agreement against the former employee.24 
 
 19. 780 S.W.2d at 119. See supra  note 17. 
 20. Steamatic of Kan. City, Inc. v. Rhea, 763 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). See 
Herrington v. Hall, 624 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). See also Deck & Decker 
Personnel Consultants, Ltd. v. Pigg, 555 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); House of Tools 
& Eng’g, Inc. v. Price, 504 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Mills v. Murray 472 S.W.2d 
6, 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Renwood Food Prods. v. Schaefer, 223 S.W.2d 144, 151 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1949). 
 21. See Easy Returns Midwest, Inc. v. Schultz, 964 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
 22. See id. 
 23. 693 S.W.2d 71, 75 (Mo. 1985).  
 24. Id. Several Missouri courts have employed stricter notions of customer contacts, 
finding that “[i]f customers only use the employer’s services on a single occassion or there is 
little repeat business, the employer does not have a stock of customers and there is no 
protectable interest.” Steamatic of Kan. City, Inc., 763 S.W.2d at 192. In West Broad. Ltd. v. 
Bell, 942 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), the court addressed the unique problem of whether 
to enforce a six-month non-competition agreement signed by a radio disc jockey. The employee 
left the radio station and took on a new air-name and persona at a different radio station. Id. at 
936. The radio station argued that the disc jockey’s voice was very recognizable and their radio 
audience might recognize her voice and switch to the other station. Id. at 937. The radio station 
argued that the covenant should be enforced because of its legitimate protectable interest in 
customer contacts. Id. The court disagreed, finding no evidence of a legitimate protectable 
interest as the disc jockey used a different name, time-slot, and format in her new position. Id. 
at 939. In his dissent, Judge Crow contended that the agreement should have been enforced 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p289 Samole.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
294 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 4:289 
 
 
3. Non-Competition Agreements Must be Reasonable in 
Geographical and Temporal Scope 
Additionally, Missouri courts analyze whether the geographical 
and temporal scope of a non-competition agreement is reasonable in 
light of the employer’s legitimate protectable interest.25 In Schott v. 
Beussink  the Missouri Court of Appeals observed that a non-
competition agreement must be reasonable as to time and space to be 
valid and enforceable.26 A non-competition agreement must protect 
the former employer from unfair competition without imposing 
unreasonable restraint on the employee.27 For example, in National 
Motor Club of Missouri v. Noe the Missouri Supreme Court found a 
non-competition agreement void and against public policy because it 
was not reasonably limited to any territory of competition.28 
Conversely, in National Starch and Chemical Corp. v. Newman the 
Missouri Court of Appeals found a non-competition agreement 
reasonable in scope even though it contained only a vague 
geographical limitation, because the agreement only restricted the 
employee for two years.29 
Missouri courts apply a “reasonable alteration” approach to non-
competition agreements that are unreasonable in scope.30 A Missouri 
court will not refuse to enforce an agreement simply on grounds that 
it contains an unreasonably broad geographical or temporal 
 
because the disc jockey exerted enormous influence over her audience. 942 S.W.2d at 942. 
 25. See, e.g., Herrington, 624 S.W.2d at 148; Grebing v. First Nat’l Bank of Cape 
Girardeau, 613 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Schnucks Twenty-Five, Inc. v. Bettendorf, 
595 S.W.2d 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Chem. Fireproofing Corp. v. Bronska, 542 S.W.2d 74 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Mitchell v. Branham, 79 S.W. 739 (Mo. Ct. App. 1904).  
 26. 950 S.W.2d 621, 625-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Osage Glass, 693 S.W.2d at 74; 
Accord Renal Treatment Ctrs. v. Braxton, 945 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).  
 27. See Sturgis Equip. Co. v. Falcon Indus. Sales Co., 930 S.W.2d 14, 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1996).  
 28. 475 S.W.2d 16, 22 (Mo. 1972). 
 29. 577 S.W.2d 99, 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). The geographic limitation in the non-
competition agreement prohibited the employee from soliciting any customers with whom the 
employee dealt while under the supervision of the former employer. Id. The court conceded that 
this was not an authentic geographic limitation and focused instead on the reasonableness of the 
time limitation in the agreement. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., AEE-EMF, Inc. v. Passmore, 906 S.W.2d 714, 719 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) 
(“Noncompete clauses not demonstrably reasonable are not enforceable, and refusal to effect 
unreasonable terms does not constitute impermissible judicial ‘re-writing’ of an agreement.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/10
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restriction.31 Under Missouri law, instead of invalidating an 
overbroad agreement, a court can modify broad restrictions to prevent 
an unreasonable restraint of the employee.32 
B. Lack of Consistency Among Other States in Their Treatment of 
Non-Competition Agreements33 
As noted above, nearly every state disfavors non-competition 
agreements because they unfairly restrain trade and people’s ability 
to earn a living.34 Nonetheless, states do not afford equal weight to 
the above general policy in their legislative or judicial treatment of 
non-competition agreements. Some states view the prevention of 
trade restraints as the single overriding policy concern in their 
treatment of non-competition agreements,35 while some states 
balance prevention of trade restraint against other policy concerns.36 
In those states that view the prevention of trade restraints as the 
overriding policy, courts evaluate the harm to the general public, as 
well as to the employee, that arises when an employer attempts to 
prevent an employee from working in a specific field.37 Those states 
 
 31. See id. 
 32. For example, in Orchard Container Corp. v. Orchard, 601 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1980), the court concluded that an employer “obviously cannot reasonably extend the 
limitations of the non-compete agreement to areas in which he has no protectable interests.” 
Proceeding on this theory, the court modified the agreement from a 200-mile restriction on 
competition to a 125-mile restriction. See Mid States Paint & Chem. Co. v. Herr, 746 S.W.2d 
613, 615-17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (reducing former salesman’s covenant not to compete from 
three to two years and from a 350-mile radius to a 250-mile radius).  
 33. A complete survey of every state’s treatment of non-competition agreements is 
beyond the scope of this Note. A comprehensive survey of this area of the law requires multiple 
volumes, as there is little consistency between states or even within each state, about the 
enforceability of these agreements. In this section, a br ief description of the treatment of non-
competition agreements among the states elucidates general inconsistencies in the law. See 
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE : A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian M. Malsberger ed., 2d ed. 
1998). Cases and statutes in this section of the Note are drawn primarily from this series.  
 34. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 35. See infra  notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.  
 37. See, e.g., Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 223 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that courts should not 
enforce a non-competition clause merely because the parties agreed to such an arrangement); 
Hekimian Lab., Inc. v. Domain Sys., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 493, 497 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (applying 
Maryland law); Clark v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 564, 565-66 (Ala. 1992) 
(concluding that a court must determine whether the restriction imposes undue hardship on the 
former employee by examining the employee’s age, marital or parental status, financial 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p289 Samole.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
296 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 4:289 
 
 
scrutinize whether the agreement is reasonable and necessary in its 
geographical and temporal scope in light of the employer’s 
protectable interests.38 However, some state courts consider the 
preservation of freedom to contract and the protection of an 
employer’s legitimate interest as competing policy concerns in 
adjudicating non-competition agreements, in addition to prevention 
of trade restraints.39 Consequently, in those states judges eschew any 
analysis of harm to the general public or the employee.40 Rather, in 
varying degrees, those state courts give greater weight to an 
employee’s consent to the agreement and to the employer’s 
protectable interests but are less strict in their analysis of the 
 
obligations, and lack of training in other areas); Data Mgmt. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 65 (Alaska 
1988) (holding that five-year statewide non-competition agreement was unreasonable because 
the agreement would bar the employee’s sole means of support); Am. Credit Bureau v. Carter, 
462 P.2d 838, 840 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that a non-competition agreement is 
enforceble only where the restraint is not unreasonably restrictive upon rights of the employee 
and does not contravene public policy); Scott v. Gen. Iron & Welding Co., 368 A.2d 111 
(Conn. 1976); Norlund v. Faust, 675 N.E.2d 1142, 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that 
in order to establish an enforceable agreement, the former employer must show that the terms of 
the agreement are reasonable with regards to: (1) the necessity of the breadth of the protection 
for the employer; (2) the restriction upon the former employee; and (3) the public interest); Roy 
v. Bolduc, 34 A.2d 479, 480 (Me. 1943) (holding that a non-competition agreement must not 
impose undue hardship on the employee and not be broader than is reasonably necessary for the 
protection of the employer); Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 406 A.2d 1110, 1312-13 
(N.H. 1997); Carolina Chem. Equip. Co. v. Muckenfuss, 471 S.E.2d 721, 723-24 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1996); Knight, Vale & Gregory v. McDaniel, 680 P.2d 448, 451-52 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984); 
Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 911 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that to 
show an enforceable non-competition agreement, an employer must demonstrate that the 
agreement does not impose undue hardship on the employee and is not injurious to the public). 
 38. See, e.g., Bernard Pers. Consultants v. Mazarella, No. CIV.A.11660, 1990 WL 
124969, at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 28, 1990) (holding that a one-year statewide non-competition 
agreement is unenforceable because its temporal and geographic scope was unnecessary to 
protect the employer’s trade secrets). See also Birmingham Television Corp. v. DeRamus, 502 
So. 2d 761 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (refusing to enforce a six month non-competition agreement 
and finding the scope of the agreement unreasonable in relation to the employer’s protectable 
interests, the employee’s young age, and new marital status).  
 39. See Uncle B’s Bakery, Inc. v. O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405, 1423 (N.D. Iowa 1996) 
(“[T]he principle of freedom of contract is entitled to some precedence where courts have 
accepted certain restraints on trade.”). See also Dick v. Geist, 693 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1985) (“[A]ny detriment to the public interest in the possible loss of services of the 
covenantor is more than offset by the public benefit arising out of preservation of the freedom 
to contract.”); Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 89 (Kan. 1996) (“[P]aramount public policy is 
that freedom to contract is not to be interfered with lightly.”).  
 40. For a statutory example of this approach, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West 
1996). Essentially, Florida’s new non-competition statute prohibits courts from analyzing any 
hardship to the employee.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/10
p289 Samole.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  Non-Competition Agreements 297 
 
 
agreement’s reasonableness.41 
Like Missouri, nearly every other state recognizes that an 
employer has a legitimate protectable interest in its trade secrets and 
customer contacts.42 However, states do not agree on the proper 
weight to afford an employer’s protectable interest in the adjudication 
of non-competition agreements.43 Most states agree on the definition 
of a trade secret, and use either the Restatement of Torts or the 
Uniform Trade Secret Act to define a trade secret.44 Conversely, state 
 
 41. Missouri and Florida are examples of such states. For Missouri’s approach, see supra 
notes 9-12, 25 and accompanying text. Missouri courts will not void a non-competition 
agreement solely on the basis of public policy because the employer’s legitimate protectable 
interests are also worthy of protection. However, some Missouri courts follow the approach of 
those states that view restraints on trade as the overriding policy concern and will void an 
agreement based on public policy grounds. For other states following this approach, see Uncle 
B’s Bakery, Inc., 920 F. Supp. at 1432 (enforcing a five-year, 500-mile radius non-competition 
agreement as applied to a bagel plant manager because of the employer’s legitimate business 
interests and a more general concern for the preservation of freedom to contract). For Florida’s 
approach to non-competition agreements, see supra note 40.  
 42. See, e.g., Owens v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 1988); SI 
Handling Sys. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3rd Cir. 1985); Nat’l Interstate Ins. Co. v. 
Perro, 934 F. Supp. 883, 890 (N.D. Ohio 1996); Sheffield v. Stoudenmire, 554 So. 2d 125, 126 
(Ala. 1989); Metcalfe Inv., Inc. v. Garrison, 919 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Alaska 1996) (noting that a 
real estate brokerage firm had a protectable interest in its customer lists and confidential 
information); Bryceland v. Northey, 772 P.2d 36, 39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Loral Corp. v. 
Moyes, 174 Ca. App. 3d 268, 276 (1985); Sunstates Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 449 
S.E.2d 858, 860 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 551 P.2d 163 (Haw. 1976); 
Ins. Assocs. Corp. v. Hansen, 782 P.2d 1230 (Idaho 1989); Jenkins v. King, 65 N.E.2d 121 
(Ind. 1946); Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 91 (Kan. 1996) (observing that “seeing that 
contracts with clients continue” is among legitimate protectable business interests); Dixie 
Parking Serv., Inc. v. Hargrove, 691 So. 2d 1316, 1320 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that 
trade secrets, including management techniques, constitute protectable employer interests); 
Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 552 A.2d 1311, 1319 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989); Kroeger v. 
Stop & Shop Co., 432 N.E.2d 566 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982); Hayes-Albion Corp. v. Kuberski, 364 
N.W.2d 609 (Mich. 1984); Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, 780 P.2d 1169, 1170 (Okla. 
1989) (concluding that an employer’s protectable interests include actual customer contacts and 
trade secrets); Paramount Office Supply Co., Inc. v. MacIsaac, Inc., 524 A.2d 1099, 1101 (R.I. 
1987); Cam Int’l L.P. v. Turner, No. 01-A-01-9203CH00116, 1992 WL 74567 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Apr. 15, 1992); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 682 (Tex. 1990); Robbins v. 
Finlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982). North Dakota is the only state that does not recognize this 
protectable interest. N.D. CENT. CODE § 0-08-06 (1987). In North Dakota, all covenants not to 
compete in the employment context are void, while those in the sale of business context are 
enforceable under certain circumstances. See also  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600-16602.6 
(West 1997).  
 43. See, e.g., id. 
 44. See supra  note 17. For other states using the Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA), see 
supra note 17. For an example of other states using the Restatement of Torts, see SI Handling 
Sys. , 753 F.2d at 1254. As the Restatement and UTSA definition are very similar 
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legislatures and courts are less uniform in their definitions of an 
employer’s legitimate protectable interest in its customer contacts. 
While some courts find that an employer has a protectable interest in 
customer lists,45 other courts do not consider a customer list to be a 
protectable interest unless the list is not readily available to the 
public.46 Furthermore, some state courts treat customer lists as an 
employer’s protectable interest only if such lists give the employee an 
unfair advantage, while others evaluate whether the employer has 
established a relationship with its customers.47 Finally, a few state 
courts consider customer contacts to be an employer’s protectable 
interest only if the employee was originally hired to obtain those 
contacts.48 
Likewise, states differ in their treatment of those non-competition 
agreements when such agreements are found unenforceable. Like 
Missouri,49 some states follow the reasonable alteration approach; 
 
inconsistencies between the states do not appear to derive from the fact that some states use the 
Restatement and others use the UTSA to define a trade secret.  
 45. See Roto-Die Co. v. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. 1515, 1518 (W.D. Va. 1995); Technical Aid 
Corp. v. Allen, 591 A.2d 262, 266 (N.H. 1991) (“When an employee is put in a position 
involving client contact, it is natural that some of the goodwill emanating from the client is 
directed to the employee rather than the employer. The employer has a legitimate interest in 
preventing its employees from appropriating this goodwill to its detriment.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 46. See In re Uniservices, Inc., 517 F.2d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that former 
employer has no protectable interest in customer lists and information that can be obtained by 
lawful surveillance); Allen v. Johar, Inc., 823 S.W.2d 824, 826-27 (Ark. 1992) (interpreting 
Arkansas Trade Secret Law, ARK.  CODE ANN. § 4-75-601 (Michie 1987), to mean that 
customer lists are an employer’s protectable interest only if customer identities are not easily 
ascertainable and the employer keeps the list of such identities confidential). 
 47. See OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (1993); Reynolds & Reynolds, Co. v. Tart, 955 F. 
Supp. 547, 552-53 (W.D.N.C. 1997) (concluding that customer contacts constitute an 
employer’s legitimate protectable business interests when employees, during the course their 
employment, develop or improve customer relationships); Darugar v. Hodges, 471 S.E.2d 33, 
36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that an employer has a protectable “interest in the customer 
relationships its former employee established at work and [a] right to protect itself from the risk 
that the former employee might use contacts so cultivated to unfairly appropriate customers 
. . .”); Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Resource Group, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 434, 
443 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (employing a permanance of relationship test to determine whether an 
employer had a legitimate protectable business interest); Empiregas Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain, 
599 So. 2d 971, 976 (Miss. 1992) (noting that an employer has an interest in protecting its 
customer base and its goodwill). 
 48. See IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerican, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1273 (N.D. Ill. 1997) 
(applying Minnesota law).  
 49. See supra  note 32 and accompanying text. 
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courts in those states will modify, subtract, or add terms to a good 
faith agreement to the extent necessary to create an agreement 
reasonable in scope.50 Other states employ a “blue pencil” approach, 
deleting unreasonable clauses in an agreement only if a more 
reasonable agreement will be left intact.51 A few states will not alter 
or “blue pencil” any sections of the non-competition agreement; if the 
agreement is unreasonable, the court will not enforce any portion or 
derivation of the agreement.52 
II. COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO CONTRACT 
LAW 
Many legal theorists use recent discoveries in cognitive 
psychology to criticize the underlying assumptions of neoclassical 
economic legal theory.53 Essentially, neoclassical economists assume 
 
 50. States that follow Missouri’s reasonable alteration approach include: Alabama; 
Arkansas; Arizona; Connecticut; Delaware; Florida; Illinois; Idaho; Iowa, Moore Bus. Forms, 
Inc. v. Wilson, 953 F. Supp. 1056, 1064 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Kansas; Maine; Massachusetts; 
Michigan, Frontier Corp. v. Telco Communications Group, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 1200, 1208-09 
(S.D. Ind. 1997) (applying Michigan law); Minnesota; Mississippi; Nevada; New Jersey; New 
York, Muller v. N.Y. Heart Ctr. Cardiovascular Specialists P.C., 656 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1997); Ohio, Nat’l Interstate Ins. Co. v. Perro, 934 F. Supp. 883, 891 (N.D. Ohio 
1996); Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania, Hillard v. Medtronic, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 173, 177 
(M.D. Pa. 1995); Texas, T EX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (1994); Tennessee, Borg-
Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495, 501 (E.D. Ky. 1996); 
Washington; and West Virginia.  
 51. In other words, the courts will not supplement or modify the agreement, but they will 
uphold a reasonable clause in the agreement if that clause is severable. States that follow the 
blue-pencil approach include: Colorado, Nat’l Graphics Co. v. Dilley, 681 P.2d 546, 547 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1984); Indiana, College Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Austin, 466 N.E.2d 738, 744 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1984); New Hampshire, Technical Aid Corp. v. Allen, 591 A.2d 262, 271-72 (N.H. 1991); 
Rhode Island, Dial Media, Inc. v. Schiff, 612 F. Supp. 1483, 1490 (D.R.I. 1985); and S.C., Cafe 
Assocs. v. Gerngross, 406 S.E.2d 162, 165 (S.C. 1991).  
 52. States that will not alter or cross-out any portion to create an enforceable agreement 
include: Arkansas,  Rector-Phillips-Morse v. Vroman, 489 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Ark. 1973) (refusing to 
enforce a contract that the parties might have made, but did not make); Georgia, Sysco Food 
Servs. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Chupp, 484 S.E.2d 323, 326 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Nebraska, Terry D. 
Whitten, D.D.S., P.C. v. Malcolm, 541 N.W.2d 45, 48 (Neb. 1995); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 103.465 (West 1997); and Virginia, Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assocs., 
492 F.2d 279, 285 (4th Cir. 1974) (applying Virginia law). States that have not yet decided 
which approach to employ for unreasonably broad or restrictive non-competition agreements 
include: California; District of Columbia; Hawaii; Louisiana; Maryland; Montana; New 
Mexico; North Dakota; New York; South Dakota; Utah; and Vermont.  
 53. See, e.g., Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk, Duress, and 
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that humans “maximize their utility, from a stable set of preferences, 
and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in 
a variety of markets.”54 The neoclassical economic rational choice 
model relies upon the assumption that decision makers “know, or can 
know, all the feasible alternative actions open to them, that they 
know, or can easily discover, all relevant prices, and that they know 
their wants and desires.”55 Accordingly, neoclassical economists 
contend that courts should enforce all agreements between such 
rational maximizers.56 Therefore, if two parties enter into a voluntary 
private exchange, both must believe the exchange is likely to make 
them better off or they would not have entered into the agreement.57 
 
Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71 (1998) (arguing that the law of adequate assurance should 
take into account cognitive psychology); Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under 
Informational Asymmetry: The Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391 (1990) 
(applying cognitive psychologists’ research on framing effects to unsafe product warnings and 
adhesion contracts); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate 
Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 329-31 (1990) (noting that cognitive defects affect director 
and shareholder attitudes to risk); Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the 
Courtroom , 37 UCLA L. REV. 273, 305 (1989) (using cognitive heuristics to describe jury 
behavior); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for 
Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 772-78 (1990) (arguing that policy makers should 
take account of cognitive error when regulating risk).  
 54. Christine Jolls, et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471, 1476 (1998) (quoting GARY S. BECKER, T HE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 14 (1976)).  
 55. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 211, 213 (1995) (quoting Thomas S. Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic 
Analysis of Law, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 385, 385-86 (1989)).  
 56. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). However, several 
economists treat covenants not to compete as an exception to the general rule that courts should 
enforce all agreements between capable actors on the theory that such contracts are 
impermissible restraints on trade and the market. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE 
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 125-26 (1995). While that view may accord with the outcome 
of this Note, the arguments and regulations suggested herein are quite distinct. Others argue that 
non-competition agreements, like all other contracts, should be fully enforced because “they are 
not anticompetitive per se, and in fact may foster competition by affording employers needed 
protection for confidential business information or investments in training.” Maureen B. 
Callahan, Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 703, 727 (1985). See Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to 
Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1981) (arguing for the enforceability of non-competition 
agreements based on economic analyses). But see Steve D. Shadowen & Kenneth Voytek, Note, 
Economic and Critical Analyses of the Law of Covenants Not to Compete, 72 GEO. L.J. 1425 
(1984) (criticizing Shedd and Rubin’s account of non-competition agreements using critical 
legal theory as an alternative to the economic approach). 
 57. See MICHAEL T REBILCOCK ,  THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM TO CONTRACT 7 (1993) 
(explaining the premise or foundation of what the author refers to as “normative economic 
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Alternatively, cognitive psychologists suggest that because 
neoclassical economics ignores important limits on human cognition 
in situations involving risk or uncertainty, it relies on an idealized and 
impossible view of human behavior.58 Cognitive psychologists seek 
to expose intellectual limits and propose methods to improve the 
quality of thinking, as well as to locate errors and biases that reveal 
the psychological processes that control judgment and inference.59 
Legal theorists who use discoveries in cognitive psychology are 
deeply concerned with the ramifications that actual, and not merely 
hypothesized, human behavior will have for the law.60 
One such theorist and preeminent contract law scholar, Melvin A. 
Eisenberg, suggested that the underlying cognitive limit inherent in 
all contracts presents concern for the future.61 Therefore, every 
contract involves varying degrees of uncertainty.62 However, for the 
neoclassical economist, actors make choices in the face of uncertainty 
and rationally elect the options that maximize their utility.63 
Neoclassical economics relies on the assumption that decisionmakers 
can accurately compute probability estimates of uncertain future 
events, determine their own attitudes toward risk, integrate all of that 
information, and choose the action that best maximizes their expected 
utility.64 In response, Eisenberg argued experiments demonstrated 
that actors systematically violate the classical rational choice model 
due to limits on human cognition, especially under conditions of 
uncertainty.65 
Eisenberg argued that contract law already recognizes many 
exceptions to the rule that courts fully enforce bargains between all 
capable actors; for example, liquidated damages,66 adhesion 
 
analysis”).  
 58. See supra notes 53 and 55.  
 59. See Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their 
Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 226 (1986) (quoting Kahneman & Tversky, 
On the Study of Statistical Intuitions, 11 COGNITION 123, 124 (1982), reprinted in JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY , HEURISTICS AND BIASES 494 (D. Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)). 
 60. See Jolls, supra note 54, at 1476.  
 61. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 212-13. 
 62. See id. at 213. 
 63. See id.  
 64. See id.  
 65. See id. at 216. 
 66. See U.C.C. § 2-718(2) (1998), which provides:  
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contracts,67 and prenuptial agreements.68 While reference to unfair 
exploitation or unconscionability can explain many exceptions to the 
classical rational choice model,69 such grounds cannot justify all 
cases of the aforementioned exceptions. For Eisenberg, cognitive 
psychology, and its recognition of the inherent limits on human 
cognition, provides an explanation to these exceptions and reveals 
how other legal doctrines should be fashioned.70 
While there is much theoretical and empirical documentation 
concerning cognitive limits, this Note examines only those specific 
cognitive limits that relate to contract law. Legal scholars who 
advocate the work of cognitive psychologists focus on the following 
two overlaping categories of systematic cognitive limitations: (1) 
bounded rationality and rational ignorance; and (2) limits based on 
defective capability. 
A. Bounded Rationality and Rational Ignorance 
Herbert Simon, the father of modern cognitive pscyhology, 
suggested that bounded rationality places serious limits on human 
cognition.71 The term “bounded rationality” encompasses the notion 
 
Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods because of the buyer’s breach, 
the buyer is entitled to restitution of any amount by which the sum of his payments 
exceeds (a) the amount to which the seller is entitled by virtue of terms liquidating the 
seller’s damages in accordance with subsection (1), or (b) in the absence of such terms, 
twenty per cent of the value of the total performance for which the buyer is obligated 
under the contract or $500, whichever is smaller.  
 67. See Hasen, supra note 53, at 424.  
 68. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 224-57. Eisenberg argued that while courts recognize 
these types of contracts and contractual provisions require special treatment, they have not 
explicitly justified this special treatment based on the limits of cognition. Id. Therefore, the 
relevant doctrines often lack a satisfactory or coherent explanation. Id. 
 69. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); 
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1998), providing:  
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to 
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the 
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable 
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any 
unconscionable result.  
 70. See Eisenberg, supra  note 55, at 216. 
 71. 3 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY  291 (1982). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/10
p289 Samole.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  Non-Competition Agreements 303 
 
 
that human cognitive abilities are finite and imperfect; it is a 
recognition that humans have limited knowledge and computational 
capacity.72 Essentially, bounded rationality describes the observable 
fact that decision makers fail to “process information perfectly even 
if they wish to do so, because human ability to calculate 
consequences, understand implications, and make comparative 
judgments on complex alternatives is limited.”73 These limitations 
include the time, energy, and financial costs of searching for and 
processing information, as well as general imperfections in human 
processing ability.74 Studies show that bounded rationality plays an 
especially significant role in cognition whenever actors assess the 
probability of uncertain events or values.75 
B. Limits Based on Defective Cognitive Capability 
Individuals sometimes act irrationally even within the scope of 
information they possess.76 Noted cognitive psychologists Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman argued that “the deviations of actual 
behavior from the [rational choice] model are too widespread to be 
ignored, too systematic to be dismissed as random error.”77 Those 
deviations include the use of heuristics, framing effects, over-
optimism, defective risk-assessment faculties, and defective 
telescopic faculties.78 
1. Heuristics 
Heuristics are rules of thumb or shortcuts individuals use when 
making decisions.79 Due to bounded rationality—the limits on human 
information processing ability—individuals employ heuristics in 
 
 72. See id.  
 73. Eisenberg, supra  note 55, at 216.  
 74. See id. at 214.  
 75. See Jolls, supra note 54, at 1480. 
 76. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 216.  
 77. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and Framing of Decisions, 59 J. 
BUS. S251, S252 (Supp. 1986).  
 78. These categories do not constitute an exhaustive list of all cognitive limits and are not 
discrete categories.  
 79. See Jolls, supra note 54, at 1477. 
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order to efficiently process available information.80 Tversky and 
Kahneman’s research has demonstrated that individuals use heuristics 
such as “availability” and “representativeness” in systematic ways 
that inevitably lead to predictable mistakes.81 
Researchers studying the availability heuristic suggest that 
individuals often retrieve only the information that is readily 
available from memory or imagination in order to make decisions.82 
Actors often favor prominent, vivid, or salient information over 
considered, tedious, or objective information about the frequency or 
probability of an event.83 Inevitably, this shortcut leads to systematic 
biases.84 
Researchers of the representativeness heuristic have demonstrated 
that instead of gathering all the relevant data to make decisions, 
individuals make decisions based on some subset of data that they 
judge to be representative.85 A decision maker using this heuristic 
evaluates probabilities by the degree to which A resembles B.86 Thus, 
individuals systematically view inordinately small samples as 
representative of larger trends.87 
2. Framing 
Behavioral studies suggest that an individual’s choices often 
depend more on the framing of outcomes than the substance of the 
factors involved.88 Surprisingly, these studies show that the effects of 
framing are so powerful that decision makers often adhere to their 
 
 80. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 220.  
 81. See Jolls, supra note 54, at 1477.  
 82. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 220. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id . at 221. For example, when asked to estimate the frequency of various causes of 
death in the United States, respondents overestimated the frequency of sensational and 
memorable causes of death, like homicide, accidents and natural disasters, and underestimated 
the frequency of less vivid causes of death like asthma, emphysema and diabetes. See Sarah 
Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCOL.: HUM. 
LEARNING & MEMORY  551 (1978). 
 85. See Eisenberg, supra  note 55, at 222.  
 86. See Hasen, supra note 53, at 395. 
 87. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 222.  
 88. See Hasen, supra note 53, at 329-30.  
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inconsistent choices even when apprised of the inconsistencies.89 
In a frequently cited study of the framing effect, Tversky and 
Kahneman divided research subjects into two groups.90 They told 
both groups that an exotic disease expected to kill six-hundred people 
will infiltrate the United States. Subsequently, they told the groups to 
choose between two alternative programs to combat the disease. The 
authors told Group One: if they adopt Program A it will save two-
hundred people and if they adopt Program B there is a 33% 
probability that it will save six-hundred people and a 66% probability 
that all will perish. Seventy-two percent of Group One selected 
Program A. The authors told Group Two: if they adopt Program C 
four-hundred people will die, and if they adopt Program D there is a 
33% probability that no one will die and a 66% probability that six-
hundred people will die. Seventy-eight percent of Group Two 
selected Program D.91 
Programs A and C communicate the same information. 
Nevertheless, 72% of the research subjects chose Program A, while 
only 22% preferred Program C. The only difference between the 
Programs is that the former is framed in terms of lives saved, while 
the latter is framed in terms of lives lost.92 Likewise, Program B and 
Program D convey the same substantive outcome and yet only 28% 
of those studied chose Program B, while 78% chose Program D.93 
Again, the only difference is framing. 
The framing effect functions like a “visual or optical illusion, 
rather than as a computational error.”94 In effect, a decision maker’s 
choice sometimes depends less on real consequences and more on 
how outcomes are framed: specifically, whether an outcome is 
framed as a gain or a loss.95 
 
 89. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 220.  
 90. See Garvin, supra note 53, at 156.  
 91. See id.  
 92. See id. at 157.  
 93. See id . 
 94. Hasen, supra note 53, at 399. 
 95. See Garvin, supra note 53, at 157. 
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3. Over-Optimism 
Cognitive psychologists’ work shows that people are 
unrealistically optimistic.96 The research demonstrates that people 
systematically overestimate benefits and underestimate risks.97 Most 
people unrealistically believe their chances are better than average for 
personal and professional success.98 In a recent study, Lynn Baker 
and Robert Emery asked people about to marry to compare their 
chances of divorce to the general population.99 The research subjects 
correctly believed that 50% of marriages in the United States end in 
divorce.100 However, they then estimated that their own chance of 
divorce was zero.101 
4. Defective Risk/Assessment 
Studies illustrate that actors systematically underestimate risks by 
failing to recognize the existence of unknown surprises in the 
future.102 For example, one study demonstrated that even when 
offered subsidized insurance premiums, individuals prefer to insure 
only against high-probability, low-loss hazards and not against low-
probability, high-loss hazards.103 Decision makers often 
underestimate low-probability or less certain hazards, regardless of 
the magnitude of potential loss.104 
 
 96. See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980).  
 97. See Garvin, supra note 53, at 149.  
 98. For example, most college students think they are more likely than their classmates to 
like their postgraduate job.  See Weinstein, supra note 96, at 809-10. Additionally, nearly 90% 
of drivers believe they drive better than average. See Garvin, supra 53, at 149.  
 99. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: 
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
439, 443 (1993).  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id.  
 102. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 222 (citing Kenneth Arrow, Risk Perception in 
Psychology and Economics, 20 ECON. INQUIRY  1, 5 (1982)).  
 103. See Martin Feldstein, The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits, 100 Q.J. ECON. 
303, 307 (1985).  
 104. At the other end of the spectrum, some people overestimate low-probability hazards. 
See W. KIP VISCUSI AND WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND 
WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 95 (1987).   
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5. Defective Telescopic Faculties 
People systematically grant too little weight to future benefits and 
costs as compared to present benefits and costs.105 In short, due to 
defective telescopic faculties, as well as over-optimism, decision 
makers often fail to sufficiently prepare for their long-term 
prosperity.106 Many theorists justify mandatory savings for Social 
Security or the fresh-start policy in bankruptcy law by reference to 
defective telescopic faculties.107 
III. APPLICATION: LIMITS ON COGNITION WHEN FACED WITH A 
NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENT 
In this section of the Note, the limits on cognition described in 
Part II are applied to the employee faced with the decision to sign a 
non-competition agreement. Through the use of a fictional example, 
this Part demonstrates how cognitive limits and defects impair the 
employee’s decision. 
A. Employees are Limited by Bounded Rationality 
When deciding whether to sign a non-competition agreement, 
employees cannot know, and it would be inefficient for employees to 
learn, every potential future alternative action open to them as well as 
all of their wants and desires. First, employers usually do not give 
employees much time to decide whether to sign a non-competition 
agreement. Second, general limitations on human information 
gathering and imperfections in human information processing 
severely restrict employees. Generally, employees cannot accurately 
 
 105. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 222. Some theorists refer to this cognitive defect as 
“myopia.” 
 106. For example, some people lie out in the sun or smoke cigarettes to reap immediate 
benefits like a suntan or a calm feeling. If individuals correctly weighed the future cost to the 
present benefits, presumably they would not sunbathe or smoke cigarettes. See Adam J. Hirsch, 
Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1, 27 (1995).  
 107. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of 
Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 317 (1982); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-
Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1392, 1408-10 (1985). 
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calculate the probabilities of termination with or without cause, 
finding compensation satisfactory over the long term, downsizing or 
better opportunities elsewhere as a result of market shifts, and of 
personal, familial, and economic factors that might effect decisions 
about employment. Third, most employees do not have the 
appropriate resources to obtain all of this information. In short, the 
list of bounds on employees when faced with the decision whether to 
sign a non-competition agreement may extend ad infinitum because 
they must choose between alternatives even though the future 
remains uncertain. 
B. Employees are Limited by Defective Cognitive Capability 
TechnO Corporation (TechnO) invited Julie for an interview after 
she spent six months searching for a job following her graduation. 
Her interview at TechnO with Bill, the hiring coordinator, went very 
well and he offered Julie a position. Bill told Julie that TechnO was a 
great place to work and that 50% of new recruits stay with the 
company for more than two years. Bill’s offer included a $4000 
signing bonus and a $40,000 yearly salary. Bill gave Julie a stack of 
notes: “All you need to start working here is to sign some notes, and 
we can get you into an office later this week.” 
Julie looked through the documents, finding information about her 
salary, health benefits, and general company policies, as well as a 
non-competition agreement. Julie took a few moments to think about 
her situation. She considered the following factors; (1) she enjoyed 
working as a research assistant for her computer science professor, 
and she always did well in school; (2) her two close friends from 
college signed non-competition agreements when they started their 
new jobs; (3) half of TechnO’s employees chose to stay with the 
company for more than two years; and (4) the signing bonus could 
cover her student loan payments for the next several months. Excited 
to embark on her new career, Julie signed the non-competition 
agreement. 
Julie’s decision to sign the non-competition agreement was 
affected by the following several cognitive defects. 
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1. Julie Enjoyed Working for Her Computer Science Professor 
and Was Successful in School 
To simplify and expedite her decision making process, Julie used 
the availability heuristic and relied on information readily available 
to her in light of her limited past experiences.108 This line of 
reasoning will become more common as employers today ask 
employees to sign non-compete agreements earlier in their careers.109 
Younger and newer employees have less experience and thus draw on 
a smaller body of information when making decisions. 
Additionally, as a result of Julie’s over-optimism, she believed 
that her past successes in school and as a research assistant meant that 
she would also find success working at TechnO.110 
2. Julie’s Friends Signed Non-Competition Agreements 
Julie used the representativeness heuristic when she relied on the 
experience of her two friends as representative of her situation, rather 
than considering the similarities and differences between TechnO’s 
non-competition agreement and the agreements her friends signed.111 
In addition, due to bounded rationality, Julie did not calculate the 
actual benefits and detriments of signing the non-competition 
agreement.112 
3. Half of the Employees Stay with TechnO for More Than Two 
Years 
As a result of Julie’s over-optimism, she neither considered the 
possibility that she could be part of the 50% that leave the company 
within two years, nor investigated the reasons why certain individuals 
left.113 To be sure, absent a difficult employment history, most 
employees are over-optimistic about their chances of success.114 
 
 108. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
 109. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.  
 111. See supra notes 81, 85-87 and accompanying text. 
 112. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.  
 113. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. 
 114. Upon receipt of an employment offer, an individual presumably feels successful and 
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Furthermore, Julie underestimated the risks involved in signing 
the non-competition agreement. While the possibility that Julie will 
need to leave the company may be low, she stands to lose plenty in 
the event that she actually does leave the company. If Julie leaves, 
she will lose not only her salary from TechnO, but also may be 
unable to find lucrative employment elsewhere as a result of the non-
competition agreement. Absent Julie’s defective risk assessment, she 
would request additional consideration to compensate her for the 
possibility of such a high-loss hazard.115 Instead, Julie used low-
probability as the sole deciding factor and accepted inadequate 
consideration for the risk of substantial loss. 
Finally, the way Bill framed this information led to Julie’s 
decision to sign the agreement.116 If Bill told Julie 50% of the 
employees left the company within two years, Julie would have 
viewed this as a loss or detriment and might not have been so quick 
to sign the agreement. Instead, due to framing effects, Julie 
understood this information as a positive gain or benefit in making 
her decision. 
4. Bill Told Julie that all She Needed to Start Working Was to 
Sign the Agreement 
Bill told Julie the benefit of signing the agreement—starting a 
new job. If Bill had said to Julie, “If you do not sign this agreement, 
then you cannot work here,” she might have requested additional 
time to consider the seriousness of the agreement.117 As such, the 
framing effect played a role in Julie’s decisionmaking process. 
 
fails to consider the probability of job termination, lack of fulfillment at work, or other 
“unhappy” variables when asked to sign a non-competition agreement. 
 115. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.  
 116. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
 117. See supra notes 3, 68. Many employees are not well versed in legal terminology. 
Therefore, they are particularly vulnerable to the ways employers describe employee retention 
rates. Given the effects of framing, one cannot assume that contract terms are accurately 
understood by employees. Presumably, the framing effect is greater for those employees who 
fail to read the agreement.  
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5. The Signing Bonus Would Help Alleviate Julie’s Mounting 
Student Loans 
Julie overlooked potential future problems that could arise as a 
result of the non-competition agreement because TechnO offered her 
the opportunity to quickly repay a portion of her student loans. Julie 
received an enticing immediate benefit: the signing bonus. Due to 
defective telescopic faculties, Julie failed to sufficiently weigh the 
long-term effects of signing the agreement.118 An employee’s 
irrational over-optimism may exacerbate the effect of defective 
telescopic faculties.119 
IV. ANALYSIS: THE ROLE COGNITIVE LIMITS OUGHT TO PLAY IN 
THE ADJUDICATION AND REGULATION OF NON-COMPETITION 
AGREEMENTS 
As Part I of this Note demonstrates, courts’ treatment of non-
competition agreements differs from state-to-state, as well as from 
court-to-court. Judicial treatment of these non-competition 
agreements is inconsistent because courts rely on faulty assumptions 
about human cognition, and thus judicial opinions are poorly 
reasoned. Additionally, as Parts II and III of this Note demonstrate, 
judicial treatment of non-competition agreements is inadequate 
because courts do not explicitly take into account the cognitive limits 
that impair an employee’s judgment. 
A. Inconsistent Treatment and Faulty Assumptions 
Like the exceptions to the rational choice model Eisenberg 
described, non-competition agreements are not always enforced by 
courts.120 Due to the significant public policy concerns, courts do not 
 
 118. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text. Today, defective telescopic faculties 
are likely to play a greater role in an employee’s signature on a non-competition agreement as 
companies increasingly offer large signing bonuses to attract desirable job applicants.  
 119. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. 
 120. Inconsistency may also be a result of tension between state statutes that prohibit all 
restraint on trade and judicially carved-out exceptions for some non-competition agreements. 
See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 416.031 (1997) (mandating that “[e]very contract, combination or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in this state is unlawful”). The tension between 
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blindly enforce any restrictive covenants on a theory of freedom to 
contract between capable actors or rational maximizers. Specifically, 
in varying degrees, courts balance the interests of the employer, the 
employee, and the general public when deciding to enforce a non-
competition agreements.121  
Even when an agreement is clear and unambiguous, the 
employee’s voluntary assent to the agreement, by itself, is 
insufficient to justify enforcement. Absent findings of 
unconscionability, duress, or diminished capacity, courts give no 
weight to an employee’s assent. Because this practice ignores the 
limits of cognition, it is unjustifiable. While concerns about the 
prevention of unfair competition and trade restraint indirectly explain 
why courts consider an employer’s protectable interests, such policies 
fail to explain, directly or indirectly, why courts ignore an 
employee’s signature on a lucid contract. 
If individuals are rational maximizers, courts need not weigh the 
benefits and detriments of an agreement for an employee. However, 
in practice, courts do weigh the benefits and detriments of an 
agreement on behalf of an employee. Therefore, courts do not treat 
the employee as a rational maximizer. Further, courts do not justify, 
legitimize, or explain their forbearance from investigating an 
employee’s assent to a non-competition agreement. As such, judicial 
opinions in this area implicitly and improperly rely upon the standard 
rational choice model. This poor reasoning, which relies upon faulty 
assumptions about human behavior, results in arbitrary and 
inconsistent treatment of non-competition agreements. 
 
state statutes’ general prohibitions against all restraints on trade and courts’ willingness to 
create exceptions to this rule results in inconsistent treatment because this area of law 
essentially becomes a collection of anomalies and exceptions. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 416.031 
(West 1996). Other states with similar tensions between the judicial and legislative response to 
non-competition agreements include: Alabama, compare ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (1993), with 
Digitel Corp. v. DeltaCom, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1486, 1496 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Georgia, compare 
GA. CONST. of 1983, art. III, § VI, ¶ V (c), with Pitman v. Harbin Clinic P.A., 437 S.E.2d 619, 
621-22 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Montana, compare MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-703, 704 (1999), 
with Dobbins, DeGuire & Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald & Olson, 708 P.2d 577 
(Mont. 1985); Ohio, compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.02 (West 1994), with Nat’l 
Interstate Ins. Co. v. Perro, 934 F. Supp. 883 (N.D. Ohio 1996); West Virginia, compare W. 
VA. CODE § 47-18-3 (1995), with Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906 (W. 
Va. 1982). See supra notes 55 and 68 and accompanying text.  
 121. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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B. Inadequate Treatment 
When courts recognize their faulty assumptions and begin to base 
judgments on empirically accurate accounts of human cognition, 
decisions will be better reasoned, less arbitrary, and more consistent. 
However, as a result of these faulty assumptions, the current 
treatment of non-competition agreements is wholly inadequate. 
Judges fail to consider cognitive limits, and, therefore, courts do not 
consider whether an employee actually knew and fully understood 
the benefits and detriments of the non-competition agreements. 
C. Solutions 
Consistent treatment is especially important in the adjudication of 
non-competition agreements. Employers must know how to create 
enforceable agreements in order to prevent unfair competition.122 In 
order to prevent unreasonable restraints on future opportunities, 
employees need to know the rights and responsibilities that arise 
when they sign a non-competition agreement. Under the current 
system, employers and employees must muddle through inconsistent, 
poorly reasoned, and wholly inadequate case law and guess whether a 
court will enforce a non-competition agreement. The judiciary and 
legislature can take actions to alleviate some of these problems. 
1. Courts 
Courts should employ recent discoveries about cognitive limits to 
explain and legitimize treatment of non-competition agreements. By 
reference to bounded rationality and other limits on cognitive 
capability, courts can justify examination of the reasonableness of 
assent to a non-competition agreement to determine its 
enforceability.123 As such, judicial analysis will be better reasoned, 
less arbitrary, and, therefore, more consistent. 
Courts should employ recent developments in cognitive 
 
 122. Unequivocal and consistent regulation of non-competition agreements is crucial in 
today’s information-driven economy.  
 123. See supra notes 71-107 and accompanying text.  
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psychology to achieve an empirically accurate analysis of the 
employee’s assent to the terms of a non-competition agreement. For 
example, in order to diminish framing effects, courts should examine 
the methods employers utilize to describe the terms in non-
competition agreements to employees.124 Courts can then better 
determine whether an employee understood the consequences of the 
agreement and thus better decide what aspects of the agreement to 
enforce. 
In light of other cognitive defects such as heuristics, over-
optimism, defective risk assessment, faulty telescopic faculties, and 
bounded rationality, courts should question the substantive fairness of 
the agreement.125 Courts should examine the following factors: (1) 
had the employee properly calculated the level of probability and risk 
of leaving the company, and how much additional consideration 
should she have bargained for given that probability; and (2) but for 
the impact of cognitive defects, would a rational employee have 
entered into the agreement. This examination will not only lead to 
enhanced judicial decisions, but also to more consistency because 
experiments demonstrate that cognitive errors and limitations are 
systematic.126 
2. Legislature 
Legislation is a more radical solution to the problem of 
inconsistency in adjudication.127 Legislation has been used to curb 
freedom to contract in other areas including consumer warranties and 
contracts against public policies.128 Legislation could provide uniform 
guidelines for employers, and thus they will be able to design 
enforceable agreements with greater certainty than under the current 
 
 124. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra  Part II.B.  
 126. See supra  note 65 and accompanying text.  
 127. Some states already have statutes regulating non-competition agreements, though they 
do not accomplish the goals set out in this Note. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West 
1996). Additionally, courts often ignore state statutes governing non-competition agreements. 
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.  
 128. For example, contracts for illegal narcotics and for prostitution are addressed by 
criminal statutes.  
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system.129 Finally, legislative regulation can provide procedural 
safeguards to protect employees from the problems that emerge due 
to cognitive limits and defects. 
The legislature should require that employers grant employees a 
waiting period in which to decide whether to sign a non-competition 
agreement. Such a period would be similar to the twenty-one day 
waiting period required under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA) for an employee’s waiver of litigation rights under the 
ADEA130 or the period required for many consumer transactions.131 
The mandatory grant of a waiting period imparts seriousness to 
employees, and, therefore, employees are more likely to actually read 
the agreement. The waiting period would also give employees more 
time to research the meaning of terms in non-competition agreements 
and consider the benefits and detriments of signing. Accordingly, 
employees would be less vulnerable to framing effects.132 And while 
employees will always be impaired by bounded rationality, a waiting 
 
 129. Legislation in this area would also resolve the tension between general statutory 
prohibitions against all restraints on trade and judicial exceptions to that rule. See supra note 
120. 
 130. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1994), which states: 
Waiver  
(1) An individual may not waive any right or claim under this chapter unless the 
waiver is knowing and voluntary. a waiver may not be considered knowing and 
voluntary unless at a minimum—(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the 
individual and the employer that is written in a manner calculated to be understood by 
such individual, or by the average invidual eligible to participate . . . (E) the individual 
is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the agreement; 
(F)(i) the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider the 
agreement; or (ii) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other 
employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the 
individual is given a period of at least 45 days within which to consider the agreement; 
(G) the agreement provides that for a period of at least 7 days following the execution 
of such agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall 
not become effective or enforceable until the revocation period has expired . . .  
The waiting period for non-competition agreements may need to be significantly shorter than 
that of the ADEA because non-competition agreements are often a condition of employment, 
and employer’s tend to hire new employees quickly. 
 131. See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1999); UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 3.501-.505 (1974). 
See also  Bryon D. Sher, The “Cooling-Off” Period in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 UCLA L. REV. 
717 (1968); Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of 
Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969). 
 132. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
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period would reduce the effects of heuristic devices and allow 
employees to gather more information relevant to the decision 
making process.133 
Next, the legislature should require specific, unambiguous, and 
conspicuous language depicting the legal consequences of signing a 
non-competition agreement, similar to the specific terminology 
required by the Uniform Commercial Code134 and Magnuson-Moss 
Act for consumer warranty disclaimers.135 Indeed, the unequal 
 
 133. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. 
 134. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2), which states, in part: 
Exclusion or Modification of Warranties . . .   
(2) . . . [T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part 
of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be 
conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion 
must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of 
fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that “There are no warranties which 
extent beyond the description on the face hereof.” 
 135. See 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (1988), stating, in part: 
Rules governing contents of warranties . . .  
(a) Full and conspicuous disclosure of terms and conditions; additional requirements 
for contents.  
 In order to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent 
deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products, any 
warrantor warranting a consumer product to a consumer by means of a written 
warranty shall, to the extent required by rules of the Commission, fully and 
conspicuously disclose in simple and readily understood language the terms and 
conditions of such warranty. Such rules may require the inclusion in the written 
warranty of any of the following items among others:  
 (1) The clear identifaction of the names and addresses of the warranties.  
 (2) The identity of the party or parites to whom the warranty is extended.  
 (3) The products of parts covered. (4) A statement of what the warrantor will do in 
the event of a defect, malfunction, or failure to conform with such written warrant—at 
whose expense—and for what period of time.  
 (5) A statement of what the consumer must do and expenses he must bear.  
 (6) Exceptions and exclusions from the terms of the warranty. (7) The step-by-step 
procedure which the consumer should take in order to obtain performace of any 
obligation under the warranty, including the identification of any person or class of 
persons authorized to perform the obligations set forth in the warranty. . . . 
 (9) A brief, general description of the legal remedies available to the consumer. . . . 
 (13) The elements of the warranty in words or phrases which would not mislead a 
reasonable, average consumer as to the nature or scope of the warranty. 
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bargaining power involved in a consumer transaction is similar to that 
of an employer-employee relationship. Requiring specific language in 
a non-competition agreement will impart seriousness to the employee 
and curb the negative effects that arise from adherence to defective 
telescopic faculties and risk assessment.136 
Alternatively, the legislature should require that employers inform 
employees about their general rights and responsibilities in 
connection with the non-competition agreement, much like the 
informed consent doctors are generally required to receive from their 
patients.137 Disclosure will curb framing effects, as well as reduce 
problems with over-optimism and other cognitive defects. 
D. Response to Paternalism Objection 
Some neoclassical economists will object to the use of cognitive 
psychology in formulating judicial guidelines and legislation as 
dangerous paternalism.138 For the neoclassical economist, the law 
should respect and enforce people’s decisions because they are 
rational actors, that is, they know what it is in their best interests. 
Some would object to the suggestions in this Note on a libertarian 
theory that any sort of legislative or judicial action that restrains or 
inhibits free will is inherently iniquitous and paternalistic.139 Such 
objections do not go to the heart of the recommendations for 
legislation and further judicial examination of non-competition 
agreements. 
First, the law is paternalistic in many other areas including the 
obvious cases involving children or incompetents.140 Examples 
 
 136. See supra notes 102-07 and text accompanying note 115. 
 137. See, e.g., ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS & REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH (2d ed. 
1986).  
 138. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 56.  
 139. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE  (1981); ROBERT NOZICK , ANARCHY, 
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). The neoclassical economist and libertarian view overlap 
extensively. More precisely, many libertarian and neoclassical economists value efficiency as a 
means to maximize individual freedom. Thus, economic freedom is a necessary precondition 
for political and individual freedom. Perhaps what most binds the neoclassical economists and 
the libertarians is the doctrine of negative liberty that states liberty is defined as freedom from 
external constraint on individual right of self-determination. 
 140. One could argue that simply because the law is paternalistic, it does not follow that the 
law ought to remain paternalistic.  
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include the following: mandatory savings plans for pension funds, the 
bankruptcy fresh start policy and the bankruptcy court’s careful 
regulation of reaffirmation agreements between debtors and 
creditors,141 mandatory seat belt142 and motorcycle helmets,143 and 
prohibitions against suicide.144 
Second, assuming absolute freedom was possible, intervention 
into one’s freedom is often necessary to further an individual’s own 
good or well-being. In defending paternalism on a theory of personal 
integrity, one might suggest that protection or paternalism is 
necessary to assure that too much liberty is not given away.145 
Empirical evidence demonstrating that actors are systematically 
prone to cognitive defects and bounded rationality legitimizes, in 
many respects, the notion that some form of paternalism is necessary 
to make sure that actors receive adequate and fair treatment from the 
legal system.  
Finally, excessive or arbitrary legal paternalism is undesirable 
because most of us want to live in a society in which the legal system 
respects our decisions and permits us to carry out our own projects 
and aspirations.146 Because experiments have shown that cognitive 
error is systematic, it follows that regulations informed by those 
cognitive errors should also be systematic. Nevertheless, excess 
 
 141. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1988), stating in part: 
Effect of discharge . . .  
(a) A discharge in a case under this title (1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, 
to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the 
debtor with respect to any debt discharged . . . whether or not discharge of such debt is 
waived; (2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of 
any action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover, or offset any such 
debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is 
waiver . . .   
 142. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE. § 27315 (West 1999). 
 143. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-5A-245 (1993); CAL. VEH. CODE § 27803 (West 1999); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6,279 (1998).  
 144. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  
 145. There may be some circularity to this argument: that is, in order to ensure that 
individuals do not bargain away their freedom, courts and legislatures sometimes must restrain 
or limit some of that freedom.  
 146. Perhaps paternalistic objectives in the hands of legislatures or the judiciary are most 
dangerous when those objectives are coupled with irrational stereotypes about the inferiority of 
a race, class, or gender.  
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paternalism is an issue because legislatures are far removed from the 
particular facts of each case and may enact overinclusive 
legislation.147 
For that reason, this Note suggests a two-tiered approach to the 
regulation of non-competition agreements. In the first tier, legislation 
provides broad procedural safeguards to structure the transaction 
between the employer and employee in order to reduce the effects of 
cognitive error and bounded rationality. In the second tier, the 
judiciary should make determinations about the substantive fairness 
and objective reasonableness of the agreement, in light of any 
cognitive limits affecting the employee’s decision to sign. Judges are 
in the best position to analyze the transaction and determine whether 
an agreement should be enforced, modified, or invalidated.148 
V. CONCLUSION 
Surely people want to think of themselves as rational decision 
makers. Since at least the Age of Enlightenment, people have 
attempted to know and understand every aspect of the universe, 
believing that they are somehow getting closer to perfect 
understanding. Perhaps over-optimism is our collective cognitive 
defect. 
Needless to say, the notion that all people are rational maximizers 
underlies our entire legal system. According to traditional contract 
analysis, individuals rationally enter into agreements, and thus courts 
should enforce them. That is the foundation of our cherished freedom 
to contract. A brief look into a first-year contracts course 
 
 147. This problem or risk is inherent in all legislative schemes.  
 148. Justice Stevens’ concurrence in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
514 (1989), provides the theoretical grounding for this approach. Stevens stated that: 
[T]his [affirmat ive action case] involves an attempt by a legislative body, rather than a 
court, to fashion a remedy for a past wrong. Legislatures are primarily policymaking 
bodies . . . [t]he constituional prohibitions against the enaction of ex post faco laws . . . 
reflect a valid concern about the use of the policitical process to punish . . . past 
conduct of private citizens. It is the judicial system, rather than the legislative process, 
that is best equipped to identify past wrongdoers and to fashion remedies that will 
create the conditions that presumably would have existed had no wrong been 
committed.  
Id.  
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demonstrates that the reasons courts enforce some agreements, 
modify other agreements, and void other agreements are inconsistent 
with the standard or classical assumptions of contract law. Absent 
explicit reference to cognitive limits, judicial reasoning will remain 
inconsistent and arbitrary. Courts, as well as legislatures must begin 
to use empirically accurate accounts of human cognition in order to 
produce more consistent and adequate treatment of agreements. 
The dangers of maintaining false underlying assumptions are 
especially obvious and alarming in the area of non-competition 
agreements. As a result of inconsistent judicial decisions in this area 
of law, employers and employees are unable to predict their legal 
rights and responsibilities and, therefore, are unsure how to best 
protect their competing interests. Moreover, because employers have 
started asking employees with little, if any, experience to sign non-
competition agreements, employees need more protection from the 
courts than ever before. Absent explicit reference to limits on human 
cognition, courts can not provide consistent or adequate treatment of 
non-competition agreements. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/10
